

THE CRISIS IN NATO

REPORT

OF THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ON THE

HEARINGS HELD BY SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

MARCH 17, 22, 23; APRIL 6, 28; MAY 3, 5, 12, 17, 25;
AND JUNE 1, 7, AND 13, 1966

PURSUANT TO

H. Res. 84

A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO CONDUCT THOROUGH STUDIES
AND INVESTIGATIONS OF ALL MATTERS COMING
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE



SEPTEMBER 21, 1966.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House
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FOREWORD

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., September 8, 1966.

This report has been submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs by the Subcommittee on Europe which held a number of hearings during March, April, May, and June on the "Crisis in NATO."

The findings and recommendations in this report are those of the Subcommittee on Europe and do not necessarily reflect the views of the membership of the full Committee on Foreign Affairs.

THOMAS E. MORGAN, *Chairman.*

FOREWORD

House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, D.C., September 2, 1905.

The report of the Commission on Foreign Affairs, which held a number of public hearings in London, Paris, and Rome, and also in the United States, is hereby published.

The findings and recommendations of the Commission are set forth in the report, and the views of the Commission are set forth in the conclusions.

THOMAS B. CLARK, Chairman.

CONTENTS

	Page
Letter of transmittal.....	vii
The crisis in NATO.....	1
I. An era of rapid change.....	1
II. The new Europe.....	1
III. NATO virtually untouched by process of change.....	3
IV. United States contributed to current crisis.....	4
V. Consequences of General de Gaulle's actions.....	4
VI. Revamping of NATO overdue.....	4
VII. NATO's basic purpose.....	5
VIII. The Communist military threat.....	5
IX. The new factor: The rise of Communist China.....	7
X. The tasks before us.....	7
XI. The issue of nuclear sharing.....	8
XII. Other forms of cooperation.....	9
XIII. Time for action.....	10
Appendix.....	11

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

AUGUST 2, 1966.

HON. THOMAS E. MORGAN,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am herewith transmitting a report on the crisis in NATO which stems from the hearings held during the past 3 months by the Subcommittee on Europe.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, our subcommittee has devoted close and continuing attention to various aspects of U.S. foreign policy toward Europe, the U.S.S.R., and the Soviet bloc. In recent years, we have held extensive hearings, conducted on-the-spot investigations, and submitted reports on such issues as the Western European Common Market; our military assistance program to Western Europe; developments in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union; the Soviet economic offensive; and others. A number of our findings and recommendations led to changes in our foreign policy undertakings, notably the foreign assistance program.

The subject of the attached report, the current crisis in NATO, has been of particular concern to us for some time. We have watched with growing apprehension the erosive effects of the passage of time, and of the economic and political rebirth of Europe, on the unity of purpose which was the hallmark of the North Atlantic community throughout the post-World War II period. We called attention to the impact of these developments on NATO and, as early as 2 years ago, recommended that high priority be accorded to the task of revising the organization to take into account the realities of the new Europe and to help restore the unity of the alliance.

In March of this year, when General de Gaulle brought the problem to a head by announcing his decision to withdraw France from the military structure of NATO, our subcommittee undertook a series of hearings to explore further the problems and the prospects of the North Atlantic alliance.

Over a period of some 3 months, the subcommittee discussed these matters with the Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; Hon. George Ball, Under Secretary of State; Hon. John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; Hon. Charles Bohlen, U.S. Ambassador to France; Hon. John McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, Supreme Commander, Allied Forces Europe; Hon. Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State; Hon. Robert Murphy, former Under Secretary of State; Hon. Thomas Finletter, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO; and with a number of distinguished members of the academic community, experts on European politics, strategy, and related subjects.

The subcommittee also had the benefit of the views and recommendations of former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and of Gen. Lauris Norstad, former Supreme Commander of the NATO forces.

The record of our hearings has been published by the Committee on Foreign Affairs in a 366-page volume entitled "The Crisis in NATO."

The report which follows is based in large part on those recent hearings. The conclusions and the recommendations outlined in it are those of our subcommittee.

We trust that the report will be of interest and help to the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and of the entire Congress, in the discharge of their legislative responsibilities.

Yours sincerely,

EDNA F. KELLY,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe.

Union Calendar No. 914

89TH CONGRESS	}	HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES	}	REPORT
<i>2d Session</i>				No. 2051

THE CRISIS IN NATO

SEPTEMBER 21, 1966.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mrs. KELLY, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, submitted the following

R E P O R T

[Pursuant to a resolution (H. Res. 84, 89th Cong.) authorizing the Committee on Foreign Affairs to conduct thorough studies and investigations of all matters coming within the jurisdiction of such committee]

IX

Union Calendar No. 214

REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE
ON THE PROGRESS OF THE PUBLIC LANDS DURING THE YEAR 1894

OFFICE REPORT

Presented to the Senate and House of Representatives
at their joint session, on January 15, 1895

BY
JAMES H. BECK, COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE

REPORT

OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE
ON THE PROGRESS OF THE PUBLIC LANDS DURING THE YEAR 1894

THE CRISIS IN NATO

I. AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE

1. *Tremendous changes have taken place in the world during the 17 years which have elapsed since the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).*

The military arsenal of the Soviet Union came to rival that of the United States. Communist China emerged from the chaos of a civil war to the threshold of nuclear capability. Western Europe recovered from the ravages of World War II and attained unprecedented levels of prosperity and technological advancement. Scores of new nations came into being, and began to exert influence on world affairs out of proportion to their real power. And a complex network of bilateral and multilateral contacts, trade, and aid, came to span the continents, stimulating both the desire and the opportunity for further expansion of peaceful exchanges and economic activity.

2. *This phenomenal process of change had a profound impact on the entire structure of relationships within the North Atlantic community.*

To understand what is happening today with NATO, to decide upon the direction in which the search for solutions to the current crisis should proceed, we must appreciate, first of all, what has been happening in Europe during the last two decades—to the physical environment of the continent, to the attitudes of its people, and to the many other factors which went into the making of NATO.

3. *Little in history can match the sheer brutality of and the devastation wrought by World War II. The war decimated the continent's human and material resources, and left Western Europe virtually powerless to check the expansionist designs of the Soviet Union.*

The experience of the war, and the Communist takeover of Eastern Europe, motivated the countries of Western Europe to band together with the United States under the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington, April 4, 1949. NATO—the formal expression of the alliance—came to symbolize Western Europe's extreme dependence on the United States and our Nation's unprecedented commitment of U.S. troops to the defense of free Europe. Under the umbrella of this one-sided collective security arrangement, the task of European reconstruction moved ahead and the movement toward Western European integration got its start.

II. THE NEW EUROPE

4. *Beginning with the 1950's, the shock of the traumatic experiences of World War II wore off and the bonds which once held the United States and Western Europe closely together began to lose their vitality and strength.*

Many factors contributed to these developments. NATO's success in containing Communist expansion, Soviet declarations of peaceful intent, de-Stalinization and consequent changes in the Soviet bloc, appeared to some to disperse the shadows of insecurity which haunted Western Europe during the immediate postwar period. The return of prosperity bolstered self-confidence particularly when dependence on the United States began to give way to active competition on the economic plane. The great drive for peace which united us in a common cause during the immediate postwar period was thwarted by Communist intransigence. Even the movement toward Western European integration—born of an earnest desire to avoid repetition of the bitter experiences of the past—began to lose momentum. And American success in checking the Soviet attempt to station missiles on Cuba was taken as proof by some that the security of Europe was somehow no longer dependent on any large-scale, coordinated military effort there.

5. The new climate of prosperity, self-confidence, and ostensible security was conducive to the revival of nationalism in Europe. The countries of that continent began to focus on their traditional sectional, national and European issues and interests.

In France, General de Gaulle moved to implement his political philosophy which regards the nation-state as the only valid and enduring collective entity in mankind's progress through history. Desirous of assuring France the position of leadership in Europe, he embarked upon an independent course of action on the international scene. He ended the Algerian war, restored political stability to France, revived the flagging economy of his country and, while cooperating to some extent with the Common Market and NATO, refused to join in any actions which could lead to economic, political, or military integration and which he felt could impair his independence of action and the sovereignty of France. His withdrawal from NATO's military structure represents a step in the implementation of his political thought.

In the meantime, West Germany having achieved her immediate postwar goals—acceptance into the family of the Western European nations, relative security, physical reconstruction, and growing economic prosperity—turned its attention to other national objectives. The reunification of Germany and the establishment of viable relationships with Eastern Europe rank high among them. Further, some Germans began to indicate that their country ought to have a larger voice in the affairs of Europe—a voice commensurate with Germany's new power and her substantial contribution to Western European security arrangements.

Great Britain, whose disposition and tastes reflect the experience of a vanished empire, had difficulty in deciding whether to seek the solution to her perennial economic problems by casting her lot with the continent or by placing primary reliance on arrangements with the Commonwealth.

And Italy, to mention another example, having gone through 20 governments in as many years, found herself devoting an increasing amount of time and energy to the resolution of political crises centered on domestic issues.

6. *One other factor warrants mention in this brief summary of developments and attitudes which came to characterize the new Europe: the return of prosperity and self-confidence rekindled the old feeling that Europe is Europe and that its interests do not necessarily coincide with those of the United States.*

This sentiment has found expression in increased independence of action on the part of the European governments and in the tendency of some Europeans to regard the cold war as a symptom of a power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union.

European policies relating to East-West trade are among those most directly affected by this changed attitude. When NATO was first formed, there existed virtual unanimity of opinion among its members as to the desirability of restricting commerce with Eastern Europe as a means of curbing the Communist countries' capacity to wage aggressive war. With the passage of time, trade between the European NATO countries and the Communist bloc increased substantially. This development is described fully in several tables appended to this report. In contrast, the United States has continued to adhere to the policy originally sanctioned by NATO. This has created a situation in which American industry continues to be restricted in its trade with Eastern Europe, while our NATO allies show little restraint when opportunities for profitable business present themselves in that area.

The divergence between the policies pursued unilaterally in this and in other fields by the NATO countries has contributed to the estrangement between the United States and certain segments of the European population.

III. NATO VIRTUALLY UNTOUCHED BY PROCESS OF CHANGE

7. *Until recently, NATO has remained virtually untouched by the complex and far-reaching developments which have transpired in Europe during the past 20 years.*

The premise on which the Organization was founded—the threat of a Soviet military attack on Western Europe—continues as the basic reason for its existence. The structure of the Organization, placing primary emphasis on the military aspects of the alliance and reserving to the United States the decisive voice in matters dealing with the security of Western Europe, remains unaltered. In the past few years, the strategy of NATO and the issue of nuclear sharing have become the subject of far-ranging debates. Apart from modest improvisations in these fields, however, the debate has not reached the point of resolution.

8. *In time, NATO'S imperviousness to change became an anachronism which began to vex some members of the alliance.*

While the war-detering value of the Organization continues to command substantial respect, dissatisfaction with the Organization began to focus on three issues: American domination of NATO; apprehension that the continued existence of the Organization as presently constituted may inhibit the solution of Europe's basic political problems; and concern that U.S. policies and actions in other parts of the world may embroil the remaining members of the alliance in conflicts in which they do not wish to become involved.

IV. U.S. CONTRIBUTED TO CURRENT CRISIS

9. *The United States must shoulder a part of the responsibility for this disaffection with NATO and, ultimately, with our own policies.*

Admittedly, there is no easy way to reconcile the various aspirations and concerns of more than a dozen sovereign nations. It is even more difficult to achieve the subordination of national interests required to produce unity and effective action. Furthermore, the great power which the United States wields in the world arena tends by its very existence to antagonize some people—even those whose freedom and security may depend on the exercise of such power.

With these things said, we nevertheless believe that the record of the U.S. Government's performance with respect to the problems which have come to trouble NATO has been less than inspiring. On various occasions, we have displayed insensitivity to the changes which have taken place on the Continent. Apparently unable to shed habits acquired during the time of the great emergency, we have tended to dictate rather than to lead. Until very recently, our efforts to bring the other members of NATO into a meaningful partnership have been sporadic, inadequate, and marked by inconsistencies. We made unilateral declarations and entered into bilateral agreements instead of trying to arrive at joint decisions on issues which affect the security of the entire North Atlantic community. And we have devoted less than our best effort to the task of promoting the mutual understanding which is vital to the achievement of unity within the North Atlantic community.

V. CONSEQUENCES OF GENERAL DE GAULLE'S ACTIONS

10. *The above discussion does not detract from our view that General de Gaulle's decision to withdraw France from the military structure of NATO was ill conceived and does damage to the alliance.*

From the physical standpoint, the French withdrawal splits the Western European defense in half. It separates Greece, Turkey, Italy, and Portugal from the remaining European members of the alliance. It makes communications, logistics, and military planning more difficult. It reduces considerably the territory available for executing defense strategy—and renders NATO's facilities more vulnerable in case of a land attack from the East.

In addition, the removal of NATO, United States, and Canadian military bases from French soil, requested by General de Gaulle, will entail a considerable financial outlay—an outlay which, in our opinion, ought to be borne largely by France.

The psychological fallout produced by the French action may also prove detrimental to the cause of European unity and security. In the long run, it may affect U.S. willingness to shoulder the sizable burden of our current commitments to the security of Western Europe, and lead to the reemergence of Germany as the dominant national power on that Continent.

VI. REVAMPING OF NATO OVERDUE

11. *While we acknowledge the seriousness of the problems created by France's decision to disassociate herself from the military organization of*

NATO, we wish to stress that this is not the sum—or the primary cause—of the difficulties confronting the alliance.

Dissatisfaction with NATO, with the attitudes and policies which are built into the existing constitution of the Organization, is not limited to General de Gaulle or even to France. It has a much broader base. And it finds its origin in the fact that NATO has not kept pace with the developments in Europe and in the rest of the world. Consequently, while we decry General de Gaulle's initiatives, and find them adverse to the long-range interests of the North Atlantic community, we also believe that a thorough revamping of NATO, and of the attitudes which currently prevail, are needed if the alliance is to survive. The heartening solidarity displayed by the 14 NATO members during the current crisis encourages us to believe that a joint approach to this task is feasible and will be effectuated.

12. The subcommittee does not have any readymade solution for curing the disarray in the North Atlantic alliance. We believe, however, that the necessary reappraisal must begin with a reference to the basic purpose of NATO.

We must ask ourselves, "What is the basic purpose of the Organization?" And, "Is this purpose valid in the light of the circumstances which obtain today?" After we answer these questions, we can proceed to examine other issues relevant to the current status and future prospects of the Organization.

VII. NATO'S BASIC PURPOSE

13. The basic purpose of NATO is to provide the 15 members of the alliance with a joint military capability sufficient to deter—or, if necessary, to repel—Communist aggression against the territory of any one, or all, of its members.

NATO has undertaken the task of developing and maintaining such military capability by devising plans for a coordinated response to Communist aggression; by establishing a series of joint—or international—military commands, including SHAPE, the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe; by undertaking joint military and naval exercises; by preparing uniform training and related standards for the national defense forces of its members; by setting up joint communications and various logistic facilities; and in other ways. In addition, the member nations have assigned all or a part of their national armed forces to NATO, to come under the Organization's command in the event of a specified kind of emergency. All of these arrangements have been predicated on the existence of a Communist military threat to Western Europe.

VIII. THE COMMUNIST MILITARY THREAT

14. Does a Communist military threat to Western Europe exist today? Has the nature of that threat changed significantly in recent years—perhaps to the point of obviating the need for the complex, time-consuming and expensive defense arrangements embodied in NATO?

For nearly 3 months, in consultation with private and governmental experts, this subcommittee has sought answers to these questions. And we considered first the evidence regarding the Communist military capability in eastern and central Europe.

The subcommittee found that the Warsaw Pact countries continue to maintain nearly 3 million men in arms. There are more than 100 Communist divisions stationed in east and central Europe. This vast concentration of military manpower is augmented by several thousand military aircraft and a substantial array of missiles targeted on Western Europe. The warmaking potential of these Communist forces is being steadily increased through the provision of new, advanced weapons, through increased mobility, and through training.

In addition, Soviet naval penetration of the Mediterranean Sea, of the Baltic Sea, and of the adjoining bodies of water has risen appreciably during the past few years. And, finally, the command of all of the Warsaw Pact forces—including the national military establishments of the Eastern European countries—continues to be coordinated and directed by Soviet personnel and the Soviet Government.

The conclusion is inescapable, therefore, that there exists today in eastern and central Europe a tremendous military force, fully capable of launching and sustaining a large-scale offensive against the Western half of the European continent.

15. In spite of this fact, some Europeans appear to feel that the nature of the Soviet military threat has changed appreciably in recent times and that the danger of Communist aggression has receded.

These assumptions are not supported by the stark reality of the Communist military capability. They are based on wishful thinking and speculation: speculation regarding Soviet intentions and the deterrent effect of the U.S. nuclear capability. We do not believe that such speculation provides a proper foundation for the security of the North Atlantic community.

History has repeatedly demonstrated the folly of basing national defense plans on an estimate of the opponent's intentions, rather than on a realistic appraisal of his military capability and the record of his past performance. The assumption that the Communists have renounced the use of force is based on most tenuous evidence. All of the Communist declarations about "peaceful coexistence" have not led to the abandonment of their goal of world domination. Neither have these proclamations resulted in the curtailment of the military power of the Warsaw Pact countries. On the contrary, as we have mentioned, that military power continues to grow.

The record of Communist performance on the international scene is equally disturbing. Certainly the experience of Berlin and Korea, and the reckless Soviet gambit on Cuba, should have long ago dispelled any illusion about Moscow's and Peking's interest in *peaceful* world revolution. The record of Communist performance also disproves the theory that fear of triggering a nuclear war will discourage potential aggressors and inhibit conventional wars. Vietnam is demonstrating today that while the techniques of warfare have changed, Communist appetite for conquest has not abated. Communist subversion is as rampant as ever. So is their support for the so-called wars of national liberation.

We must conclude, therefore, that the military threat to Western Europe—and to the rest of the free world—has not vanished. Until we see some genuine evidence that the Soviet Union's proclaimed desire for peace is real—evidence which we would welcome—we submit that the collective security arrangements which constitute the basic purpose of NATO are as needed today as they have ever been.

16. *Two additional considerations argue in favor of Western European military preparedness and the maintenance of unity within the North Atlantic community. The first relates to the issue of Soviet intentions toward Western Europe.*

It is this: If, as some Europeans maintain, their continent is the checkerboard in a power contest between the Soviet Union and the United States, it is also the prize which may decide the ultimate outcome of that contest. Control of the magnificent resources of Europe—some 350 million highly skilled people equipped with an industrial establishment and material resources which rival those of the United States—could help the Soviet Union attain the position of primacy in world affairs. The threat of the use of force, applied when Western Europe is divided in purpose and militarily weak, could achieve for the Soviets what they can no longer hope to gain through overt aggression; gradual exclusion of the United States from the continent, demilitarization of Europe, and full access to the human and material resources of the continent.

IX. THE NEW FACTOR: THE RISE OF COMMUNIST CHINA

17. *The second consideration relates to Communist China and the distinct possibility that that country's rise to power may increase the military threat to Western Europe.*

A nation of some 700 million people, led by an aggressive totalitarian regime, and within an arm's reach of possessing nuclear weapons, Communist China promises to exert an unsettling influence on world affairs for some time to come. Today, the Communist regimes of China and of the Soviet Union control the destiny of nearly one-third of the human race. Further, in spite of their ideological and tactical differences, the two regimes are united in their determination to bring to an end the age of capitalism. Commonsense suggests, therefore, that we should not let our guard down—and that we give added thought to the prospect that, in the long run, disunity may increase the risks which confront us today.

X. THE TASKS BEFORE US

18. *We must now turn to the central issue of this report: If the realities of our age and our self-interest argue for the retention of NATO, how can that organization be transformed to become a force for the unity—as well as the security—of the North Atlantic community?*

It seems to us that the task of reorganizing the Organization ought to proceed in several directions. We have already alluded to some of them. At the risk of becoming repetitive, we will restate our conclusions on this subject and endeavor to amplify them.

19. *In the first instance, it seems to us that NATO needs a much broader charter than its present constitution.*

Consideration should certainly be given to the possibility of expanding the base of the Organization. In view of the loss of territory involved in France's withdrawal from the military structure of NATO, Spain is certainly a logical candidate for membership in the Organization. In addition, while never forgetting the necessity for maintaining a strong military defense of Europe, NATO should not neglect consideration of the security problems of other areas of the world.

As matters stand today, the security of Europe depends not only on what the Soviet Union may do in Europe, but also on what Communist China and the Soviet Union may do on other continents. It would appear logical, therefore, that the alliance concern itself with the security requirements of other areas.

There are also urgent reasons for reconsidering the marginal attention thus far accorded by NATO to the objectives of article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty: encouragement of economic cooperation, strengthening of free institutions, promotion of conditions of stability and well-being, and others. Article 2, it seems to us, provides significant opportunities for imaginative and constructive action programs which could unite the nations of the North Atlantic area in joint undertakings to advance the well-being of their own region and to assist the developing countries.

20. *Second, the remodeled Organization should become the forum for the discussion, initiation, and coordination of actions designed to enlarge the areas of peaceful cooperation between the East and the West.*

We believe that the goal of world peace must always remain uppermost in our thoughts and actions. We endorse and encourage the expansion of peaceful contacts with the peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia. We hope that the Communist regimes of those areas will recognize the futility of armed aggression, and begin to devote increasing portions of their national budgets to the improvement of human welfare—rather than to subversion and preparations for war. We would welcome such a development and be happy to cooperate in joint undertakings to build peace. And we believe that NATO, by addressing itself to these issues, could make a positive contribution to the resolution of some of the basic political problems of Europe: The East-West division of the continent, reunification of Germany, and others.

In advancing these suggestions, we are fully aware that the prospects of attaining permanent relaxation of tensions and of solving some of the above-mentioned problems, would improve tremendously if the peoples of Eastern Europe, and of Asia, had the opportunity to elect governments of their own choice and to free the pursuit of their national objectives from the encumbrances of Communist dogma. The attainment of that condition must remain our objective in NATO.

XI. THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR SHARING

21. *Third, in any discussion dealing with the reorganization of NATO, the issue of nuclear sharing should receive the most thorough attention.*

In raising this issue, we realize that its resolution rests largely in the hands of the United States. Our Nation owns and controls upward of 95 percent of the nuclear capability of the free world. Moreover, the cost of establishing and maintaining even a token nuclear force is beyond the means of most of our partners.

The McMahon Act, enacted when the development of nuclear science was in its infancy, and the succeeding legislative enactments, restrict the extent to which the United States may share atomic and nuclear technology with our allies. The advances achieved by the Soviet Union, France, and Red China, and the realities of the new Europe, argue for a thorough review of the restrictive provisions of our prevailing policy in this field.

22. *Fourth, it seems to us that France's withdrawal from the military structure of NATO makes necessary a reappraisal of the conventional military capability of the Organization and of the policies which have governed NATO's operations for a considerable period of time.*

This review is already underway within the framework of the so-called McNamara committee. We trust that it will be advanced with vigor. There is little doubt that changes in military technology, and progress in equipping the allied forces with modern weapons, have rendered obsolete some parts of the conventional military machinery of the Organization. This obsolescence ought to be remedied. The conventional military structure of NATO should be streamlined, more equitable cost-sharing arrangements arrived at, and new initiatives undertaken to pave the way for a possible reciprocal reduction in land forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

In this connection, however, we must bear in mind that the Soviet Union is much closer to the heartland of Europe than the North American Continent, and that the withdrawal of Soviet forces from central Europe cannot be equated with the recall of a comparable number of U.S. military personnel stationed in Germany. Nevertheless, we ought to explore the possibility of reducing the U.S. military contingent in Europe. The presence of U.S. forces in Europe should be directly related to the changing security requirements of the continent and ought not to be considered permanent. Also, we should not be expected to make up by our military presence in Europe for possible shortcomings of other NATO partners who may not be living up to their responsibilities.

XII. OTHER FORMS OF COOPERATION

23. *Finally, we again wish to underline our conviction that the tasks of collective security are no longer sufficient to keep the alliance together and that we must seek closer cooperation with Europe in other areas in order to maintain unity.*

In this regard, we should like to call attention to the tremendous advances achieved in recent years by the United States in many fields of human endeavor, particularly in industrial and scientific technology. These advances, bolstered by our substantial capital resources, made it possible for our industry to find an expanding market in Europe. At the same time, they enabled us to acquire increasing, and at times controlling, interests in various branches of the European industry, particularly those highly advanced segments which are prime factors in national economic progress.

The latter development has tended to alienate some segments of the European population. It seems to us that in order to build the foundation for a beneficial, long-range relationship with Europe, we ought to give more thought to the mutual sharing of knowledge and scientific advances. Otherwise, there may develop exclusionist policies which can only work to the detriment of all concerned.

XIII. TIME FOR ACTION

24. *In advancing our suggestions regarding the manner in which the United States ought to address itself to the solution of the crisis in NATO, we do not wish to minimize the tasks confronting us.*

As we said in one of our earlier reports on this subject, the job of restructuring the North Atlantic alliance "can consume the energies of a generation of able, well-intentioned statesmen." We also realize that the United States finds itself in a somewhat delicate position: an intensive effort on our part to effect the modernization of NATO may annoy those among our allies who are already inclined to interpret any U.S. initiative as an attempt to dictate or to dominate. We feel, nevertheless, that these risks are small in comparison with the damage that can result if we fail to provide bold, imaginative leadership necessary to help NATO overcome the problems of obsolescence. The United States must provide such leadership.

Two years ago, a study mission of this subcommittee recommended that the United States apply itself urgently to the "difficult task of fashioning a new, or a revised, institutional framework which will take into account the changed economic and political status of our Western European allies, reflect their desire for individual identity and increased self-responsibility, and still enable us to work jointly to meet the security requirements of the North Atlantic community."

That task is still before us. We must act with courage and boldness, or prepare to face the consequences of growing world instability, discord, and danger.

APPENDIX

TABLE I.—*NATO countries' exports to the U.S.S.R.*

[Annual totals f.o.b.—Millions of U.S. dollars]

	1958	1960	1962	1963	1964	1965
Belgium-Luxembourg.....	17.64	18.84	25.56	13.20	14.8	22.6
Denmark.....	12.96	16.20	20.64	28.92	34.8	30.8
France.....	75.60	115.56	138.12	64.20	64.1	72.0
Federal Republic of Germany.....	72.12	185.28	206.76	153.60	193.6	146.5
Greece.....	16.68	18.72	19.20	22.44	24.2	26.9
Iceland.....	10.80	9.96	10.92	10.68	10.1	6.8
Italy.....	30.96	78.96	103.20	114.96	90.8	92.8
Netherlands.....	10.80	11.76	31.92	23.76	14.9	29.3
Norway.....	14.64	12.84	10.44	12.72	17.0	18.5
Portugal.....	1.80	2.40	—	—	—	—
Turkey.....	12.96	4.80	5.52	7.08	9.0	18.7
United Kingdom.....	145.44	148.92	161.04	178.80	111.2	128.5
Total NATO Europe.....	422.40	624.24	733.32	630.36	584.5	598.8
Canada.....	19.44	8.40	3.12	139.20	292.8	182.9
United States.....	3.60	39.60	20.04	22.92	146.4	44.4
Total North America.....	23.04	48.00	23.16	162.12	439.2	227.3
Total NATO.....	445.44	672.24	756.48	792.48	1,023.7	826.1

TABLE II.—*NATO countries' imports from the U.S.S.R.*

[Annual totals c.i.f.—Millions of U.S. dollars]

	1958	1960	1962	1963	1964	1965
Belgium-Luxembourg.....	25.20	27.12	43.08	51.12	49.8	46.3
Denmark.....	16.44	28.80	23.40	24.48	26.0	34.6
France.....	94.68	94.68	110.64	141.12	141.1	146.0
Federal Republic of Germany.....	91.92	158.52	186.36	163.68	170.4	210.5
Greece.....	14.16	28.20	20.28	28.44	27.4	36.5
Iceland.....	14.88	12.24	10.32	11.88	11.0	12.1
Italy.....	39.72	126.48	166.92	176.76	147.2	181.3
Netherlands.....	40.92	44.40	36.36	47.28	35.6	52.9
Norway.....	18.96	19.32	18.24	21.36	25.8	28.2
Portugal.....	.72	2.28	—	.36	—	—
Turkey.....	6.84	5.88	6.48	8.88	8.0	16.7
United Kingdom.....	166.56	209.76	235.56	254.64	253.0	333.0
Total NATO Europe.....	531.00	757.68	857.64	930.36	895.3	1,098.2
Canada f.o.b.....	1.68	3.24	1.68	2.16	2.6	9.1
United States f.o.b.....	16.80	22.80	16.32	21.24	20.8	42.6
Total North America f.o.b.....	18.48	26.04	18.00	23.40	23.4	51.7
Total NATO.....	549.48	783.73	875.64	953.76	918.7	1,149.9

TABLE III.—*NATO countries' exports to Eastern Europe*¹

[Annual totals f.o.b.—Millions of U.S. dollars]

	1958	1960	1962	1963	1964	1965
Belgium-Luxembourg.....	44.64	75.48	61.08	60.48	62.7	70.5
Denmark.....	30.24	39.24	55.20	51.24	44.3	64.9
France.....	69.60	105.00	129.00	161.88	170.7	229.0
Federal Republic of Germany ²	395.76	500.90	522.88	500.10	644.8	739.0
Greece.....	20.76	26.04	31.20	35.28	40.5	48.0
Iceland.....	12.00	5.40	4.68	5.64	5.9	8.1
Italy.....	56.88	93.96	138.72	156.24	185.0	231.2
Netherlands.....	40.92	50.76	44.52	48.12	59.0	75.1
Norway.....	22.44	25.56	27.12	33.60	41.6	44.7
Portugal.....	3.12	4.68	5.52	6.36	6.8	6.2
Turkey.....	49.32	34.32	21.12	28.32	28.8	48.0
United Kingdom.....	68.40	121.20	207.72	195.24	179.6	194.2
Total NATO Europe.....	814.08	1,082.54	1,248.76	1,282.50	1,469.7	1,759.1
Canada.....	3.84	28.20	42.48	40.32	149.6	99.5
United States.....	108.00	153.60	104.76	143.52	192.7	95.0
Total North America.....	111.84	181.80	147.24	183.84	342.3	194.5
Total NATO.....	925.92	1,264.34	1,396.00	1,466.34	1,812.0	1,953.6

¹ Comprising Poland, the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania.² In the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, figures comprise interzonal trade deliveries.TABLE IV.—*NATO countries' imports from Eastern Europe*¹

[Annual totals c.i.f.—Millions of U.S. dollars]

	1958	1960	1962	1963	1964	1965
Belgium-Luxembourg.....	31.68	48.36	54.12	62.88	67.8	74.2
Denmark.....	40.92	48.96	59.64	60.00	72.5	79.2
France.....	78.84	59.88	86.76	109.80	118.0	126.3
Federal Republic of Germany ²	397.52	484.00	509.82	545.16	573.4	694.4
Greece.....	25.44	27.12	34.44	39.96	45.9	65.8
Iceland.....	12.72	7.92	6.84	7.56	10.2	9.9
Italy.....	61.68	140.28	166.44	249.36	223.4	257.0
Netherlands.....	36.48	52.92	62.76	73.20	89.7	97.9
Norway.....	23.52	26.64	29.40	30.12	41.4	40.1
Portugal.....	2.16	5.52	4.44	4.20	9.6	11.4
Turkey.....	50.28	36.60	31.20	41.28	34.0	40.9
United Kingdom.....	119.64	179.52	206.16	226.68	268.6	283.7
Total NATO Europe.....	880.88	1,117.72	1,252.02	1,450.20	1,554.5	1,780.8
Canada f.o.b.....	8.28	10.20	14.16	16.68	22.8	29.4
United States f.o.b.....	44.40	56.40	62.16	59.40	78.0	94.8
Total North America f.o.b.....	52.68	66.60	76.32	76.08	100.8	124.2
Total NATO.....	933.56	1,184.32	1,328.34	1,526.28	1,655.3	1,905.0

¹ Comprising Poland, the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania.² In the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, figures comprise interzonal trade deliveries.

TABLE V.—*NATO countries' trade with the Soviet bloc (U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe ¹) as a percentage of their world trade*

	NATO exports to the bloc as a percentage of their exports to the world						NATO imports from the bloc as a percentage of their imports from the world					
	1958	1960	1962	1963	1964	1965	1958	1960	1962	1963	1964	1965
Belgium-Luxembourg----	2.0	2.5	2.0	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.8	1.9	2.2	2.2	1.9	1.9
Denmark-----	3.5	3.8	4.7	4.3	3.8	4.3	4.3	4.3	3.9	4.0	3.8	4.0
France-----	2.8	3.2	3.6	2.8	2.6	3.0	3.1	2.5	2.6	2.9	2.6	2.6
Federal Republic of Germany ² -----	5.2	5.9	5.4	4.4	5.1	4.9	6.4	6.2	5.6	5.3	5.0	4.1
Greece-----	16.2	22.0	20.3	19.9	20.9	22.8	7.0	7.9	7.8	8.5	8.3	9.0
Iceland-----	34.9	23.1	18.5	17.3	14.4	11.6	32.1	22.7	19.2	17.7	16.2	16.0
Italy-----	3.5	4.7	5.1	5.3	4.6	4.6	3.2	5.6	5.5	5.6	5.1	6.0
Netherlands-----	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.4	1.3	1.7	2.1	2.1	1.9	2.0	1.8	2.0
Norway-----	5.0	4.4	3.9	4.3	4.5	4.4	3.2	3.1	2.9	2.8	3.4	3.1
Portugal-----	1.7	2.2	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.1	.6	1.4	.8	.7	1.3	1.3
Turkey-----	23.6	12.2	7.0	9.6	9.2	14.6	18.2	9.1	6.1	7.3	7.8	10.0
United Kingdom-----	2.3	2.6	3.3	3.2	2.4	2.3	2.7	3.1	3.5	3.6	3.3	3.9
Total NATO Europe-----	3.5	3.9	4.0	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.7	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.6	3.9
Canada-----	.5	.7	.8	2.8	5.7	3.5	.2	.3	.3	.3	.3	.5
United States-----	.6	1.0	.6	.7	1.3	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.5	.6
Total North America-----	.6	.9	.6	1.2	2.5	1.2	.4	.5	.4	.4	.5	.6
Total NATO-----	2.4	2.8	2.8	2.7	3.0	2.7	2.7	2.9	2.9	3.0	2.8	3.0

¹ The latter comprising Poland, the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania.

² In the case of the Federal Republic of Germany figures comprise interzonal trade deliveries.

1. The first part of the report is a general introduction to the subject of the study. It includes a brief history of the field and a statement of the purpose of the study.

2. The second part of the report is a detailed description of the methods used in the study. This includes a description of the subjects, the materials, and the procedures.

3. The third part of the report is a presentation of the results of the study. This includes a description of the data and a discussion of the findings.

4. The fourth part of the report is a discussion of the implications of the study. This includes a discussion of the theoretical implications and the practical implications.

5. The fifth part of the report is a conclusion. This includes a summary of the findings and a statement of the conclusions.

6. The sixth part of the report is a list of references. This includes a list of the books, articles, and other sources used in the study.

7. The seventh part of the report is an appendix. This includes a list of the tables, figures, and other materials used in the study.

8. The eighth part of the report is a glossary. This includes a list of the terms used in the study and their definitions.

9. The ninth part of the report is a bibliography. This includes a list of the books, articles, and other sources used in the study.

10. The tenth part of the report is an index. This includes a list of the topics covered in the study and the pages where they are discussed.